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Abstract
This paper investigates the competitive and welfare eﬀects of information accuracy im-
provements in markets where ﬁrms can price discriminate after observing a private and noisy
signal about a consumer’s brand preference. It shows that ﬁrms charge more to customers
they believe have a brand preference for them, and that this price has an inverted-U shaped
relationship with the signal’s accuracy. In contrast, the price charged after a disloyal sig-
nal has been observed falls as the signal’s accuracy rises. While industry proﬁt and overall
welfare fall monotonically as price discrimination is based on increasingly more accurate
information, the reverse happens to consumer surplus.
JEL Code: D43, D80, L13, L40
Keywords: Competitive Price Discrimination, Imperfect Customer Recognition, Imperfect
Information.
1 Introduction
For decades many companies like Amazon, WalMart and Target have collected vast amounts of
data on every person who regularly shops on their stores. The increasing use of the Internet,
smartphones/tablets and the development of more sophisticated methods for tracking, storing
and analysing consumer purchase patterns have dramatically improved the capability of ﬁrms
to predict the consumer types/preferences and to set prices accordingly.
Target, the ﬁfth-largest retailer in America, assigns every customer a unique code (Guest ID
number). Every time a customer buys a product with a credit card, visits its website, ﬁlls out a
survey or interacts with the retailer in any way, Target assigns this information to the customer
ID code. Demographic information collected from customers or bought from other sources is
also assigned to the customer ID number. By analysing their private customer databases, sellers
can try to ﬁgure out what each customer likes, to create a brand preference category score and
to predict which oﬀers are most likely to make each customer buy. A recent article in The New
York Times (February 16, 2012) explains how Target can, through its data mining program,
assign each shopper a “pregnancy prediction” score as a way to send speciﬁc oﬀers to pregnant
∗I am extremely grateful to Mark Armstrong for helpful discussions and suggestions. Thanks for comments on
early versions of this paper (with title Price Discrimination with Private and Imperfect Information) are due to
Paul Klemperer, Robin Mason, and participants at the 2008 EARIE Conference and at the 2008 Latin American
Meeting of the Econometric Society. Thanks are also due to the Editor and two referees that provided constructive
comments and suggestions. The support of Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia is gratefully acknowledged.
Of course, any errors remain my own.
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customers.1,2
However, despite all the technological advances, customer recognition devices and predictive
models are not perfectly accurate. The inability of ﬁrms to perfectly predict (recognise) the
tastes of individual customers implies that some of them will be wrongly recognised and will
be oﬀered the wrong intended oﬀer. In the telecommunications industry, for instance, AT&T
once mailed three rebate checks to a marketing executive of MCI to switch phone services (Chen
et al. (2001), p.24). The Oﬃce of Fair Trade’s report (May, 2010) on “Online Targeting of
Advertising and Prices” states that when users share a computer the ﬁrms’ oﬀers might be
received by the wrong users. The report gives the example of a child viewing a games website
received a behaviourally re-targeted advert for champagne after an adult bought wine online
using the same computer (p. 35).3 Another article published in The New York Times (February
21, 2012) highlights that when ﬁrms try to predict consumer needs and preferences by looking
at hundreds of thousands to millions of people, some predictive errors are expected and as a
result of that some customers will receive the wrong message. As an example, the same article
refers that several women revealed that they continued to receive pregnancy-related mailers from
Target for months after a miscarriage.4
The main theme of this paper is to investigate how proﬁt, consumer surplus and overall
welfare change as ﬁrms have access to more accurate information about consumers for price
discrimination purposes. With the exception of Chen et al. (2001) and Liu and Serfes (2004), the
literature on competitive price discrimination with customer recognition has mainly considered
situations in which the information available for price discrimination is accurate and the same to
all rival ﬁrms. In comparison to Chen et al. (2001) and Liu and Serfes (2004), this paper proposes
a diﬀerent approach to model information quality improvements. In doing so, it highlights that
a good economic understanding of the proﬁt, consumer surplus and welfare implications of price
discrimination based on more accurate information do depend on the way in which one models
the information improvements and on the nature of consumer preferences.
The paper adds to the literature on pricing with customer recognition a theoretical model
that encompasses situations where due to imperfect information, each ﬁrm does not know for sure
(i) whether a given consumer is classiﬁed into the right segment and (ii) how the rival segments
that same consumer. One way of dealing with this possibility is by introducing some randomness
in the accuracy of a ﬁrm’s private information. The paper addresses, in section 2, a Hotelling
model where two ﬁrms A and B sell their products directly to consumers whose loyalty degree
towards the right-hand ﬁrm (ﬁrm A) is indexed by their location along an interval. Each ﬁrm’s
private imperfect information comes from the observation of a noisy signal that is not seen by
the rival ﬁrm, which informs with only some level of accuracy whether a customer favours brand
A or rather brand B. One important implication of this assumption is that markets are no longer
completely separate as some consumers will be misrecognised and will receive the wrong intended
price. The model addressed in this paper ﬁts also well pricing policies that are possible through
the use of mobile devices. CBS News reports that nowadays it is possible to analyse the recent
movements of a mobile device user among stores in a shopping mall, and to predict whether a
particular store will be the next destination for the mobile device user.5 If, say, restaurant A is
1See the article “How companies know your secrets”, available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/
shopping-habits.html
2The most popular part of this story was the fact that Target was able to know that a teen girl was pregnant
before her father knew.
3The OFT report is available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaﬂets/659703/OFT1231.pdf
4See the NYT article on “Behind the Cover Story: How Much Does Target Know?”available at
http://6thﬂoor.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/behind-the-cover-story-how-much-does-target-know/
5See http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505124_162-57342567/amazon-big-brother-patent-knows-where-youll-
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more likely to be visited than restaurant B, diﬀerent oﬀers can be sent by the two restaurants
to that mobile device user.6 The model can also be applied to pricing policies that will be
possible through the increasing use of (not perfectly accurate) facial recognition technologies.7
An article published at The Washington Times (July 16, 2012) reveals that [Businesses foresee
a day when signs and billboards with face-recognition technology can instantly scan your face
and track what other ads you’ve seen recently, adjust their message to your tastes and buying
history.]8 ,9
Section 3 looks at the equilibrium price behaviour of ﬁrms. As in the extant literature (e.g.
Thisse and Vives (1988), Chen (1997) and Fudenberg and Tirole (2000)) it is shown that ﬁrms
will always set a higher price to a consumer recognised as loyal than to a consumer they believe
have a brand preference for the rival’s product (Proposition 2). In section 4, I explore the
competitive eﬀects of information improvements on the equilibrium outcomes. Regarding the
eﬀects on prices, we will see that the price for customers recognised as loyal has an inverted-U
relationship with the signal’s accuracy and may be above (below) the non-discrimination level for
low (high) levels of the signal’s accuracy. In contrast, the price charged to a customer recognised
as disloyal is always below the non-discrimination level, and lower the more accurate is the signal
(Corollary 1).
The welfare analysis is presented in section 5. Here, it is shown that, when ﬁrms have
information to price discriminate, consumer welfare is always above the non-discrimination level
and increases monotonically as the accuracy of the private signal rises. In contrast, industry
proﬁt and overall welfare are always below the non-discrimination levels and fall monotonically
as ﬁrms possess increasingly more accurate information (Proposition 3).
The way consumer information is used by ﬁrms has increasingly attracted the attention of
regulators, policy makers and privacy advocates. This paper oﬀers some criterion to assess how
overall and consumer welfare evolve as price discrimination is based on more precise information
(recognition) of consumers . It suggests that any advice to a regulatory authority should take
into account whether the target is welfare or solely consumer surplus. It highlights that when
information about consumers is used for price discrimination purposes, any policy restricting
the use and/or the access to more accurate information could act in favour of industry proﬁts
and overall welfare but against consumer welfare.10
Related literature This paper is related to the literature on price discrimination in im-
perfectly competitive markets,11 mainly to the literature on behaviour based price discrimination
go/
6Another example from CBS states that [...mobile device users attending a large venue may be tracked and
provided coupons for vendors the mobile device users are likely to pass based on their recent travel patterns in
and around the venue.]
7 In the article referred in footnote 8 we can read that [...despite major advances in the technology in recent
years, many limitations remain, (...) while recognition algorithms match faces accurately 99.7 percent of the time,
the studies are conducted only in controlled situations with perfect pictures and perfect lighting. In less-pristine
settings, pictures may be blurry or have large shadows, and the reliability rates will suﬀer.]
8Available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jul/26/just-a-face-in-a-crowd-scans-pick-up-id-
personal-d/
9The FTC issued a report on October 23, 2012 on the uses of facial recognition technology. Available at
http://ftc.gov/os/2012/10/121022facialtechrpt.pdf.
10 It is important to stress that this paper looks only on the use of information about consumers for price
discrimination purposes. Obviously, the discussion on consumer privacy issues is far more complex than the
present analysis.
11Armstrong (2006) and Stole (2007) provide comprehensive reviews on competitive price discrimination.
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(BBPD) and customer recognition.12 Most of this literature has assumed that ﬁrms can perfectly
(i) recognise each individual consumer’s tastes and oﬀer them personalized prices (e.g. Thisse
and Vives (1988)) or (ii) group consumers into two diﬀerent segments, their own (loyal) and the
rival’s customers and price accordingly (e.g. Chen (1997), Villas-Boas (1999), Fudenberg and
Tirole (2000), Shaﬀer and Zhang (2000)). In either case all ﬁrms price discriminate on the basis
of the same piece of information and with no uncertainty about the consumer types.
Thisse and Vives (1988) show that when ﬁrms have the same piece of information about each
individual consumer (i.e. each ﬁrm observes a public fully accurate signal of each consumer’s
brand preference), and ﬁrms base their prices on this observed signal (i.e. ﬁrms set personalized
prices), then each consumer is a completely separate market to be contested. As a result, they
show that price discrimination may intensify competition leading all prices and proﬁts to fall
compared to the non-information (no discrimination) case.13
Other papers have extended the Thisse and Vives’s analysis to frameworks where, although
ﬁrms are unable to observe the brand preferences of individual consumers, they are able to
recognise them only as their own customers or as the rival’s customers. By observing the
consumers’ past purchasing decisions, ﬁrms obtain a public and perfectly accurate signal of
whether a consumer prefers its brand or the rival’s one. Therefore they can price diﬀerently
towards their loyal and the rival’s customers. However, because information is fully precise and
public there is neither misrecognition of consumers nor uncertainty about how the rival classiﬁes
the same customer. In these papers information may disclose exogenous switching costs (e.g.
Chen (1997), Taylor (2003) and Gehring and Stenbacka (2004)), or exogenous brand preferences
(e.g. Villas-Boas (1999), Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) and Shaﬀer and Zhang (2000)). These
models assume that ﬁrms observe the same piece of information and thereby each consumer is
classiﬁed into the right segment. For instance, in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) after a ﬁrm has
observed whether or not a consumer bought its product previously, it is able, in period 2, to
segment the market into old (loyal) customers and rival’s (disloyal) customers. Once one ﬁrm
recognises a customer as a loyal one it must be the case that the competitor recognises that
customer as a disloyal one. Because each ﬁrm tries to poach each other’s customers, a common
ﬁnding is that price discrimination acts to intensify competition leading all segment prices to
fall as well as proﬁts.14
This paper is most closely related to Chen et al. (2001) and Liu and Serfes (2004). Chen
et al. (2001) investigate the proﬁt eﬀects of price discrimination when ﬁrms cannot perfectly
recognise (target) a captive customer from a switcher. Firms compete only for switchers. When
targetability is not perfect it may happen that a captive consumer receives the price tailored
to a switcher and vice-versa.15 A low level of targetability tends to soften price competition
for switchers as ﬁrms try to avoid that some captive consumers receive a very low price. For
this reason they show that proﬁts may increase with improvements in targetability when it
departs from a low enough level. When ﬁrms’ targetability becomes suﬃciently high further
improvements in targetability will intensify competition and lead to a prisoner’s dilemma. The
present paper complements Chen et al. (2001) by proposing a diﬀerent distribution for the
consumers’ brand tastes. While in Chen et al. (2001) there are three mass points of consumers,
12Chen (2005), Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2007) and Esteves (2009b) present updated literature surveys on
BBPD.
13 In Thisse and Vives all prices fall when consumer brand preferences are uniformly distributed.
14For other recent papers on BBPD and customer recognition see also Caillaud and De Nijs (2011), Chen and
Pearcy (2010), Esteves (2010), Esteves and Vasconcelos (2012), Esteves and Regiani (2012), Gehring, Shy and
Stenbacka (2011), (2012), Ghose and Huang (2006), Ouksel and Eruysal (2011), Shy and Stenbacka (2011), (2012).
15They deﬁne targetability as a ﬁrm’s ability to predict the preferences and purchase behaviours of individual
consumers.
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captive consumers to each ﬁrm and switchers and ﬁrms compete only for switchers, here there
is a continuum of consumer loyalties. In doing so we will see that improvements in information
accuracy will produce diﬀerent proﬁt outcomes. Thus, the paper highlights that the distribution
of consumer preferences plays an important role in the results derived. Finally, the paper
also complements Liu and Serfes (2004), where consumer preferences are also distributed on a
Hotelling line. However, the information quality improvements are modelled in a diﬀerent way.
In their approach, the quality of information allows ﬁrms to partition the Hotelling line (with
no mistake) into k intervals, and better information corresponds to ﬁner partitions, being the
more informative case the one where each ﬁrm knows the location of each individual consumer.16
In this paper, ﬁrms observe a noisy signal that partition the Hotteling line into two segments
with a chance of mistake and better information is modelled as a reduced chance of classifying
a consumer into the wrong segment. Like in the present paper, Liu and Serfes (2004) ﬁnd that
moving from no discrimination (no information) to discrimination is bad for industry proﬁt and
good for consumer surplus. However, conditional on the availability of information they ﬁnd
that equilibrium proﬁts have a U—shape relationship with respect to information improvements
and consumer surplus have an inverse U-shape as a function of the information quality. Thus,
the use of a diﬀerent setup to model information quality improvements explains the diﬀerent
outcomes obtained in both papers. I elaborate more on these diﬀerences in section 6.
2 The model
There are two ﬁrms A and B who sell competing brands of a good produced, without loss of
generality, at zero marginal cost.17 The total number of consumers in the market is normalized
to one. Each consumer wishes to buy a single unit either from ﬁrm A or B and is willing to pay
at most v. The reservation value v is suﬃciently high so that nobody stays out of the market.
Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to the brand loyalty degree. Following Raju, et al.
(1990) the degree of brand loyalty can be deﬁned as the minimum diﬀerence between the prices
of two competing brands necessary to induce a consumer to buy his less preferred brand. A
consumer’s brand loyalty towards brand A is represented by a parameter l uniformly distributed
on the interval

−1
2
, 1
2

, with density 1 and it is assumed that l ≤ v. All else equal, a consumer
with 0 < l ≤ 1
2
prefers brand A, while a consumer with −1
2
≤ l < 0 prefers brand B.18 A type
l consumer who buys his favorite brand, say brand i, enjoys a net surplus equal to v − pi; if he
buys his less preferred brand, say j, his net surplus is v − pj − |l| , where i, j = A,B.
Each consumer has private information about his loyalty degree. Firms are not able to
observe the degree of loyalty of individual customers. However, it is assumed that each ﬁrm has
consumer-speciﬁc private information–acquired either from specialized information vendors or
from the ﬁrm’s databases that record the customers’ individual purchase histories–that enables
it to predict (with some probability) whether a customer prefers its brand or rather the rival’s
one. Suppose that for each consumer ﬁrm i observes a private noisy signal, si, that informs
whether that customer is loyal to brand A (si = α) or loyal to brand B (si = β). The signal
gives no information about the extent of this preference. After a noisy signal has been observed
for a particular consumer each ﬁrm only knows that he is a loyal or a disloyal consumer with some
probability. This means that consumer recognition is imperfect, and so market segmentation for
16For a paper on information quality improvements and personalized products (rather than personalized prices)
see Bernhardt, Liu and Serfes (2007).
17The assumption of zero marginal costs can be relaxed without altering the basic nature of the results derived
throughout the model.
18Shaﬀer and Zhang (2002) and Liu and Serfes (2006) model the distribution of consumer brand preferences in
a similar way. However, they allow for asymmetric loyalties towards ﬁrms as lA > lB > 0.
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the purpose of price discrimination will be also imperfect. A more accurate signal is associated
with better information which is then reﬂected in a higher ability of ﬁrms to classify correctly
potential customers.
When price discrimination is permitted, a ﬁrm’s pricing strategy consists of choosing a price
to a customer it believes is likely to prefer its good and choosing a diﬀerent price to a customer
perceived as one that favours the rival’s product. In short, conditional on a given consumer
true type, suppose that ﬁrm A and B observe an independent private noisy signal si ∈ {α, β} ,
i = A,B, about that consumer’s brand preference. While α informs that the consumer prefers
brand A, β informs that the consumer favours brand B. It is common knowledge that the
probability of each signal conditional on each consumer’s loyalty degree l is given by:
q (l) = Pr (si = α | l) and 1− q (l) = Pr (si = β | l) . (1)
Assume further that q (l) is increasing in l, meaning that the greater is the degree of loyalty of
a particular consumer, the higher is the probability of a ﬁrm observing a loyal signal.19 For the
sake of simplicity consider that
q (l) =
1
2
+ bl, with 0 ≦ b ≦ 1, (2)
where b measures the signal’s accuracy. When b = 0 the signal has no informational content and
ﬁrms have no way to distinguish customers. In contrast, the signal discloses increasingly more
accurate information as b approaches 1, thereby allowing ﬁrms to better recognise customers. For
intermediate values of b some consumers are incorrectly classiﬁed by ﬁrms, i.e. some consumers
loyal to brand A are misrecognised as loyal to brand B and vice-versa.
After receiving a signal for a given customer ﬁrms update their own beliefs over this cus-
tomer’s true type and form beliefs about the rival’s signal for the same customer. The density
function of l, denoted f (l) (which in this case is equal to 1) and q (l) are common knowledge of
both ﬁrms and form the basis of their prior and posterior beliefs. Hence, after receiving signal
si ∈ {α, β}, using Bayes rule, each ﬁrm’s posterior belief about a customer’s loyalty degree is
given by the conditional density function hsi(l) where
20
hα(l) = Pr (l | si = α) =
Pr (si = α | l) f (l)
Pr (si = α)
=
q (l)
Pr (si = α)
, (3)
hβ(l) = Pr (l | si = β) =
Pr (si = β | l) f (l)
Pr (si = β)
=
[1− q (l)]
Pr (si = β)
, (4)
and
Pr (si = α) =
 1
2
− 1
2
q (l) f(l)dl =
1
2
and Pr (si = β) =
 1
2
− 1
2
[1− q (l)] f(l)dl =
1
2
. (5)
Given signal si = k, ﬁrm i believes that ﬁrm j’s signal is sj = α with probability
ρk = Pr (sj = α | si = k) . Therefore,
ρα = Pr (sj = α | si = α) =
Pr (sj = α, si = α)
Pr (si = α)
= 2λαα (6)
19For instance, when say ﬁrm A’s signal is based on data on consumers’ past purchasing behaviour, it is more
likely that ﬁrm A observes a loyal signal for a consumer that bought its product many times in the past than for
a customer that bought few times or did not buy at all from A in the past.
20Notice that hsi(l) satisﬁes the property
 1
2
− 1
2
hsi(l)dl = 1.
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ρβ = Pr (sj = α | si = β) =
Pr (sj = α, si = β)
Pr (si = β)
= 2λβα (7)
where λkr = Pr (si = k, sj = r) ; k, r = {α, β} .
Conditional on a consumer loyalty degree l, the signals observed by ﬁrms are independently
distributed. That is
Pr (si = k, sj = r | l) = Pr (si = k | l) Pr (sj = r | l) .
Thus,
λkr =
 1
2
− 1
2
Pr (si = k, sj = r | l) f(l)dl. (8)
Since both ﬁrms observe signal α with equal probability it follows that λβα = λαβ, therefore it
is straightforward to obtain that:
λαα = λββ =
1
4
+
b2
12
and λαβ = λβα =
1
4
−
b2
12
. (9)
Lemma 1. For any level of the signal’s accuracy it follows that ρα  ρβ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In words, when ﬁrm A observes signal α for a particular consumer it believes that it is more
likely that the rival observes the same type of signal for that consumer. (Note that ρα =
1
2
+ b
2
6
.)
Hence, more accurate signals reduce each ﬁrm’s uncertainty about the rival’s private information.
Firms also form beliefs about the loyalty degree of a given consumer after signals si and sj
have been observed. This is given by the conditional density function gkr(l) where,
21
gkr(l) = Pr (l | si = k, sj = r) =
Pr (si = k | l) Pr (si = r | l) f (l)
Pr (si = k, sj = r)
. (10)
Finally,
Gkr(x) = Pr (l < x | si = k, sj = r) =
 x
− 1
2
gkr(l)dl. (11)
3 Equilibrium analysis
Consider ﬁrst the benchmark case where price discrimination cannot occur either because it is
illegal or because the signal has no informational content (i.e. b = 0). Here the setup is analogous
to a standard symmetric Hotelling model, playing the loyalty parameter l the same role as the
transportation cost. If ﬁrms cannot price discriminate in the symmetric equilibrium they will
set the non-discrimination price pN =
1
2
. With non discrimination, equilibrium proﬁt per ﬁrm
is πN =
1
4
, consumer surplus is CSN = v −
1
2
, and total welfare is WN = 2πN +CSN = v.
Consider now the case where price discrimination is permitted and ﬁrms price diﬀerently to
consumers they believe are likely to prefer their product and to consumers they believe have a
preference for the rival’s product. Formally, upon observing signal si ∈ {α, β} , ﬁrm A chooses
pAsA ∈

pAα , p
A
β

and ﬁrm B chooses pBsB ∈

pBα , p
B
β

. For the sake of simplicity, assume sA = k
21Notice that gkr(l) satisﬁes the property
 1
2
− 1
2
gkr(l)dl = 1.
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and sB = r, where k, r = {α, β} . I will use the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) as the solution
concept. Equilibrium prices are obtained solving the ensuing maximization problems:
Max
pAsA
E

πA | sA = k

and Max
pB
sB
E

πB | sB = r

, where
E

πA | sA = α

= pAα

r∈{α,β}
Pr

pAα < p
B
r + l | sA = α, sB = r

Pr (sB = r | sA = α)
= pAα
	
ρα

1−Gαα

pAα − p
B
α

+ (1− ρα)

1−Gαβ

pAα − p
B
β


, (12)
and,
E

πA | sA = β

= pAβ

r∈{α,β}
Pr

pAβ < p
B
r + l | sA = β, sB = r

Pr (sB = r | sA = β)
= pAβ
	
ρβ

1−Gβα(p
A
β − p
B
α )

+

1− ρβ
 
1−Gββ(p
A
β − p
B
β )


. (13)
Symmetric expressions hold for ﬁrm B. Since the game is symmetric we are looking at an
equilibrium solution where pAα = p
B
β and p
A
β = p
B
α . Denoting as pL the price charged to customers
recognised as loyal and as pD the price oﬀered to customers recognised as disloyal it follows that
pL = p
A
α = p
B
β and pD = p
A
β = p
B
α . Since G is a cubic function the model does not allow for
closed-form solutions. However, imposing the condition y = pL − pD the answer is obtained
implicitly.
Proposition 1. When ﬁrms price discriminate on the basis of private and imperfect in-
formation about consumer brand preferences, the symmetric BNE in prices is given by
pL =
1
4
+ 1
8
b− 1
4
y − 1
2
by2 − 1
3
b2y3
1
2
+ by + b2y2
, (14)
and
pD =
1
4
− 1
8
b+ 1
4
y + 1
2
by2 + 1
3
b2y3
1
2
+ by + b2y2
, (15)
with y implicitly deﬁned as y + 2by2 + 5
3
b2y3 − 1
4
b = 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Despite the cubic equation in y, there is only one real root for all values of b ∈ [0, 1] , thus
the symmetric interior solution presented in Proposition 1 is unique.
Proposition 2. (i) When the signal has no informational content ( b = 0), price discrim-
ination is unfeasible and equilibrium prices are pL = pD = pN =
1
2
.
(ii) For any informative signal (i.e. b > 0) it is always true that pL > pD.
Using (14) and (15) part (i) is easily obtained. Figure 1 (see next section) conﬁrms part (ii),
it shows that for any level of the signal’s accuracy pL > pD. Thus, ﬁrms will charge more to
customers they believe have a brand preference for their product than to customers that, from
their perspective, are more price-sensitive, which are those recognised as disloyal.
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4 Competitive eﬀects of information improvements
This section investigates the competitive eﬀects of price discrimination as the ﬁrms’ ability to
recognise customers more accurately gradually improves.
4.1 Prices
Using the equilibrium solutions presented in (14) and (15) we obtain the following result.
Corollary 1. When b > 0 then:
(i) the price charged to a customer recognised as disloyal is always below the non-discrimination
price, i.e. pD < pN ;
(ii) the price charged to a customer recognised as loyal is above the non-discrimination price
when the signal’s accuracy is not too high, and below the non-discrimination price when the
signal’s precision is high;
(iii) the more informative is the signal the greater is the diﬀerence between the two discrim-
inatory prices, i.e. pL − pD increases with b.
Np
Lp
Dp
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
b
Figure 1: Relation between prices and b
In models of competitive price discrimination with perfect information there are mainly two
eﬀects at work. There is the “surplus extraction eﬀect” through which price discrimination al-
lows a ﬁrm to extract greater surplus from those consumers willing to pay more for its product.
There is also the “business stealing eﬀect” through which the ability to set discriminatory prices
gives each ﬁrm an incentive to reduce the price to disloyal consumers as a way to poach them
from the rival. When price discrimination is based on imperfect information, due to the impre-
cision of the signals, ﬁrms may classify consumers incorrectly and, consequently, oﬀer them the
wrong intended price. In this case, there is another eﬀect at work, namely the “misrecognition
eﬀect”.22 The latter is actually an eﬀect on eﬀect because it changes the strength of the two
traditional eﬀects. This eﬀect weakens both of the two traditional eﬀects in comparison to “no
misrecognition”, when the signal’s precision is low and ﬁrms are more likely to classify customers
22 In Chen et al. (2001) there is a similar eﬀect which they designate as the “mistargeting eﬀect”.
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incorrectly. As the signal’s accuracy improves ﬁrms are more certain about a consumer’s true
type and so the two traditional eﬀects become stronger.
Figure 1 shows that the price to a consumer recognised as disloyal is always below its non-
discrimination counterpart and falls with information’s quality improvements. When informa-
tion precision is low, ﬁrms have less incentives to decrease the price to a consumer that generates
a disloyal signal, because there is a good chance that the consumer turns out to be a loyal one.
As information quality improves, consumers can be recognised more accurately by both ﬁrms
which compete more aggressively. This leads to further reductions in pD.
An interesting ﬁnding of the paper is that the price charged to customers recognised as loyal
has an inverse U-shaped relationship with the signal’s accuracy. Figure 1 shows that pL is above
its non-discrimination counterpart when the signal’s accuracy is (approximately) below 0.5, the
reverse happens for b > 0.5.23 Since the two traditional eﬀects go in the opposite direction, the
total eﬀect from an increasingly precise signal may not be monotone. The justiﬁcation for the
inverted U-shape behaviour is as follows.
Suppose that ﬁrm A observes a loyal signal (i.e., signal α) for a particular consumer. An
improvement in information accuracy increases ﬁrm A’s ability to classify correctly this consumer
and so to extract consumer surplus by raising pL. Better information also helps ﬁrm B to be
more certain about that consumer’s true type, and so to respond with lower prices. Consider
ﬁrst the case where the increase in information precision starts from a low level of precision
leading pL to raise with b. At low levels of information precision, when ﬁrm A observes a loyal
signal it takes into account that ﬁrm B will price cautiously because the consumer may be its
own. If the consumer is in fact loyal to A, he will be willing to buy from A as long as pL−pD < l.
As ﬁrm B prices less aggressively at low levels of information accuracy, this allows ﬁrm A to
win this consumer even raising pL. Additionally, at low levels of information accuracy it is more
likely that both ﬁrms observe diﬀerent signals which means that a consumer may be oﬀered pL
by both ﬁrms. If the consumer is in fact loyal to ﬁrm A he will buy from A. In other words,
increases in information precision when the information accuracy starts from a low level, allows
the surplus extraction eﬀect to dominate and pL to rise with better information.
Consider now increases in information accuracy when information precision departs from a
high level. Suppose again that ﬁrm A observes a loyal signal (i.e., signal α) for a particular
consumer. As the quality of information becomes increasingly more precise, although ﬁrm A
is more certain about that consumer type, the same happens to the rival ﬁrm which now has
more incentives to respond with a lower price if signal α is also observed. It is also increasingly
more likely that both ﬁrms observe signal α (λαα increases in b). In order to avoid loosing
this consumer ﬁrm A needs to reduce its price. Better information when information quality
departs from a high level, increases the head-to-head competition for each consumer leading the
“business stealing eﬀect” to become stronger as b gradually improves. Therefore, at high levels
of the signal’s precision further improvements in b lead to further reductions in pL.
Summing up, for suﬃciently low levels of the private signal’s accuracy (i.e. b  0.25)
increases in b raise the informational content of the signal, competition is not so intense, the
surplus extraction eﬀect dominates and the price to a consumer recognised as loyal increases
with improvements in information’s accuracy. As information becomes increasingly more precise,
the likelihood of misrecognition decreases, ﬁrms compete more aggressively and the “business
stealing eﬀect” becomes stronger, pL starts to decrease. Nevertheless, when 0.25  b  0.5, the
“surplus extraction eﬀect” is high enough to dominate the “business stealing eﬀect” allowing pL
23Numerical analysis shows that pL reaches its maximum value approximately at 0.5154 for b ∼= 0.25 and is
equal to the non-discrimination level for b ∼= 0.5. When b = 1 the price charged to a perceived loyal customer falls
to 0.44 (lower than the non-discrimination level).
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to be above pN . In contrast, when information becomes increasingly more and more accurate
(i.e. b  0.5) the “business stealing eﬀect” dominates the “surplus extraction eﬀect” and the
price to a loyal consumer falls below its non-discrimination counterpart.
Note that in Chen et al. (2001) because ﬁrms only compete for switchers the price to custom-
ers recognised as captive (loyal) is always above the non-discrimination level and is increasingly
higher as ﬁrms become increasingly able to distinguish a captive from a switcher. In our model,
each consumer is a market to be contested, thus a very accurate signal intensiﬁes price compet-
ition explaining why both prices are in this case below the non-discrimination level. The latter
result conﬁrms a common ﬁnding in the previous literature. When each ﬁrm’s strong market is
the rival’s weak market (in the terminology of Corts (1998) there is best response asymmetry),
price discrimination acts to intensify competition leading all segment prices to fall (e.g. Thisse
and Vives (1988), Chen (1997) and Fudenberg and Tirole (2000)).
4.2 Proﬁts
This section investigates how proﬁts respond to information’s accuracy improvements.
Lemma 2. Let γL and γD denote the probability of a ﬁrm winning a customer with a loyal
and a disloyal signal. Then,
γL =
1
2
+ b2y3 + by2 +
1
2
y (16)
and
γD =
1
2
− b2y3 − by2 −
1
2
y. (17)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that the greater is the accuracy of each ﬁrm’s private signal the greater is the probability
of a ﬁrm winning a customer with a loyal price and the lower is the probability of a ﬁrm winning
a customer with a disloyal price.24 Additionally, it is straightforward to verify that for any b > 0
it immediately follows that y > 0 and so γL > γD.
Let EπL and EπD represent, respectively, each ﬁrm expected proﬁt from a loyal and a
disloyal signal.
EπL = pLγL = pL

1
2
+ b2y3 + by2 +
1
2
y

, (18)
EπD = pDγD = pD

1
2
− b2y3 − by2 −
1
2
y

. (19)
Given that Pr (si = α) = Pr (si = β) =
1
2
each ﬁrm expected aggregate proﬁt, denoted by EΠ
is equal to
EΠ =
1
2
(EπL +EπD) . (20)
Corollary 2. (i) The proﬁt from a loyal signal exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship
with the private signal’s accuracy. Conversely, the proﬁt from a disloyal signal falls monotonic-
ally as the signal’s accuracy improves.
(ii) Expected proﬁt with price discrimination under imperfect information is always below
the non-discrimination proﬁt and falls monotonically as the accuracy of the private signal rises.
24 It is easy to check that as dy
db
> 0 then dγL
db
> 0 and dγD
db
< 0 for any b ∈ ]0, 1] . Thus, γL is strictly increasing
in b and γD is strictly decreasing in b.
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Figure 3: Expected aggregated proﬁt
Figure 2 illustrates the ﬁrm’s proﬁt conditional on a loyal and a disloyal signal and the
precision of the private signal. Obviously, the relationship between the proﬁt from customers
recognised as loyal (disloyal) and the accuracy of the private information is strongly related to
the relationship between the price conditional on a loyal (disloyal) signal and the accuracy of the
signal. We have seen before that when a ﬁrm’s signal is not very accurate–i.e. b approximately
below 0.5–a ﬁrm is able to extract more surplus from customers recognised as loyal which
clearly is good for proﬁts. However, when the signal becomes increasingly more accurate ﬁrms
compete more aggressively which leads to lower prices and proﬁts. Similarly, because the price
charged to customers perceived as disloyal always falls as the accuracy of information improves,
the same happens to proﬁts from perceived disloyal customers.
Look next at expected aggregate proﬁt as ﬁrms rely on more accurate information. Figure
3 shows that expected aggregate proﬁt (and so industry proﬁt) falls monotonically as the ac-
curacy of the private signal rises and it is always below the non-discrimination level. This is
true even when b is low and ﬁrms can raise the price to consumers recognised as loyal. The
reason is that although ﬁrms can charge higher prices to consumers recognised as loyal when
the signal is not too precise, the probability of winning a customer with a loyal price is smaller.
Thus, the expected surplus extraction beneﬁt is not enough to overcome the reduction in proﬁts
from a lower price being charged to a consumer recognised as disloyal. Because more accurate
information gives rise to more aggressive pricing, the model shows that ﬁrm and industry proﬁt
increase when price discrimination is based on highly inaccurate information.
4.3 Expected number of Ineﬃcient Shoppers
With price discrimination some consumers might have an incentive to swap to their less preferred
brand. It is straightforward to see that the expected number of ineﬃcient shoppers (EIS) is
equal to:25
EIS =
1
2
y + by2 +
2
3
b2y3. (21)
The number of customers who buy ineﬃciently in equilibrium under price discrimination depends
on the informativeness of the signal and on the diﬀerence between prices (i.e., y). As expected,
when discrimination is not allowed every consumer buys the most preferred brand. When price
25Because the model abstracts from any previous competition, it is more convenient to adopt the term ineﬃcient
shoppers rather than the usual “switchers” which is more indicate to situations in which consumers choose one
brand in one period and a diﬀerent one in the other period.
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discrimination is permitted, more accurate information gives rise to more ineﬃcient shopping in
equilibrium.26 We have seen that as information’s precision improves the diﬀerence between pL
and pD is higher. As a result of that, those customers with a smaller loyalty degree–i.e. those
located in the middle–will have more incentives to buy the wrong brand. When the signal
reaches its maximum level of accuracy, i.e. when b = 1, approximately 12.5% of customers buy
ineﬃciently, which means that ﬁrms attract some consumers that prefer the rival’s brand.
5 Welfare analysis
This section investigates the welfare eﬀects of price discrimination based on more accurate
information. As usual expected overall welfare is deﬁned as the sum of expected industry proﬁt
and expected consumer surplus (ECS). Hence, EW = 2EΠ+ECS.
Lemma 3. Expected consumer surplus is given by:
ECS = v − pLγL − pDγD −
1
4
y2 −
2
3
by3 −
1
2
b2y4. (22)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 3. (i) As a whole consumer surplus with discrimination is above the non-
discrimination level, and it increases monotonically as the accuracy of the private signal rises.
(ii) Each individual consumer is increasingly better oﬀ as price discrimination is based on
more accurate information.
In order to evaluate the welfare eﬀects of improvements in the private signal’s accuracy, I
assume, without any loss of generality, that v = 2. Figure 4 shows expected consumer surplus
as the accuracy of the private signal rises. Thus, it conﬁrms part (i) of corollary 3. Likewise
Figure 5 conﬁrms part (ii). It shows expected consumer surplus for l ∈

−1
2
, 1
2

and for a ﬁxed
level of the signal’s accuracy.
When discrimination is not allowed (b = 0) expected consumer surplus per consumer is
constant, regardless the loyalty degree l. Speciﬁcally, when v = 2, ECS = 1.5. Although
ECS remains approximately at the same level when b is too small, when the signal becomes
increasingly more informative, ECS increases with b. As the signal becomes more and more
precise, price competition is more intense and so consumers can buy at better deals.
Despite consumers as a whole are unequivocally better oﬀ with price discrimination, we have
seen that for not too accurate signals (b  0.5) some consumers are expected to face a higher price
than under non-discrimination. At a ﬁrst glance this could suggest that not all consumers would
beneﬁt when price discrimination is based on low quality information. Nevertheless, Figure 5
shows that even in the range where loyal customers are expected to pay a higher price with
discrimination, expected consumer surplus is above its non-discrimination counterpart. Notice
that pL reaches its maximum value when b is approximately equal to 0.25 and even in this case
ECS for the most loyal customers, i.e., for those with l =
	
−1
2
, 1
2


is higher than ECS under
non-discrimination. The reason is that although for small levels of the signal’s accuracy loyal
customers are expected to pay higher prices, it is also true that with some positive probability
they will be misrecognised and have the chance of buying the product at the lowest price pD.
26When b > 0 it follows that dEIS
db
> 0.
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Look now at the expected overall welfare. Using (20) and (22) it ensues that:
EW = v −

1
4
y2 +
2
3
by3 +
1
2
b2y4

. (23)
Proposition 3. Price discrimination is always good for consumers although bad for proﬁts
and overall welfare. Further, consumers are increasingly better oﬀ, while ﬁrms and welfare are
increasingly worse oﬀ as price discrimination is based on more accurate private signals.
Equation (23) shows that welfare is equal to v minus the disutility incurred by those con-
sumers who buy ineﬃciently. As y increases monotonically as the private signal rises, the higher
is b the higher is

1
4
y2 + 2
3
by3 + 1
2
b2y4

, so the lower is welfare. Because with non-discrimination
aggregate welfare equals v, it is clear-cut that with discrimination expected welfare is always
below the non-discrimination level. As ﬁrms become increasingly able to recognise customers,
and to segment them more accurately, the stronger is the damage of price discrimination on
aggregate welfare. In fact, one can see that welfare reaches its minimum value when the signal’s
accuracy reaches its maximum level. The reason is that the expected number of consumers who
buy ineﬃciently in equilibrium reaches its maximum value when b = 1. Because in the present
model there is no role for price discrimination to increase aggregate output, variations in wel-
fare are uniquely explained by the “disutility” supported by those consumers who do not buy
the most preferred brand.27 In this paper, information improvements give rise to an increasing
number of ineﬃcient shoppers which clearly is not good for welfare.28
6 Main implications of information accuracy improvements
Taking into account our ﬁndings and those in Chen et al. (2001) and Liu and Serfes (2004) we
can say that the proﬁt and welfare eﬀects of price discrimination based on better information
(more accurate recognition of consumers) do depend on the way the information improvement
is modelled, on what is learned about consumer demand and on the nature of preferences.
Table 1 shows that this paper’s ﬁndings are diﬀerent from the predictions in Chen et al.
(2001) and Liu and Serfes (2004). It also shows that the other two papers are silent about the
eﬀects of information precision improvements on overall welfare. The same happens in Chen et
27For a model with BBPD with elastic demands see Esteves and Regiani (2012).
28This result is in contrast with that achieved in Thisse and Vives (1988). The reason is that in their model
price discrimination based on perfect information gives rise to no welfare loss since no consumer actually switches
in equilibrium. Here because ﬁrms can only segment consumers into loyal or disloyal (as in Fudenberg and Tirole
(2000)) there are always some consumers who buy ineﬃciently. Therefore, here price discrimination based on
better information increases the welfare loss.
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al. (2001) with regard to the consumer surplus eﬀects. Next we discuss with more detail the
main diﬀerences and intuitions behind the three approaches.
Models Proﬁts ECS W
Chen,et al.(2001)
Above/Below ND
inverse U-shaped
? ?
Liu and Serfes (2004)
Below ND
U-shaped
Above ND
inverse U-shaped
?
Present paper
Below ND
decrease
monotonically
Above ND
increases
monotonically
Below ND
decreases
monotonically
Table 1: Comparative static results (ND: No discrimination)
Chen at al. (2001) use a duopoly model with three mass points of consumers: captive to each
ﬁrm consumers who never compare prices and switchers who buy from the ﬁrm oﬀering the lowest
price. As in our framework, in Chen et al. (2001) the information for price discrimination comes
in the form of a noisy signal about the loyalty of each customer. When consumer preferences are
distributed on a Hotelling line, the information about consumer preferences can be modelled at
least following the present paper’s approach or the one presented in Liu and Serfes (2004). In
the latter approach, the quality of information allows ﬁrms to partition the Hotelling line into k
intervals (with no mistake), and better information corresponds to ﬁner partitions. While Liu
and Serfes’ approach is more consistent with segmentation on the basis of consumers’ purchase
histories, Chen et al. (2001) and our approach are more consistent with segmentation on the
basis of predictive models such as those nowadays used by Target, Amazon and other major
retailer. These models analyse consumers’ purchase histories, demographics, habits, as so on,
in an attempt to predict the consumers’ types, desires and future needs and allow sellers to
better market their products. 29 As referred in the Introduction, our approach ﬁts also well
pricing policies that will be surely permitted through the use of mobile devices, which go with us
everywhere, and will allow the prediction of our next destinations/actions through the analysis
of our recent movements/decisions.30
Proﬁt eﬀects Equilibrium proﬁts with price discrimination are always below the non-
discrimination counterparts in this paper and in Liu and Serfes (2004). However, while in this
paper ﬁrm and industry proﬁts fall monotonically as the accuracy of information rises, in Liu
and Serfes (2004) proﬁts are U-shaped as a function of information accuracy.
In this paper information comes in the form of a noisy signal which allows ﬁrms to partition
with a chance of mistake the Hotelling line in two segments: loyal and disloyal. Better inform-
ation reduces the chance of classifying a consumer into the wrong segment. Even though ﬁrms
29Liu and Serfes (2004, p. 22) present an example that is also helpful to clarify in which circumnstances it is
more appropriate to use one of the two approaches. Suppose there are two competing automobile manufacturers,
one American and one European. Consider ﬁrst the case where the ﬁrms have access to the consumers’ purchase
history. If a customer is a lifetime purchaser of American cars, then the two ﬁrms can use this information
to recognise this consumer as loyal to the American cars. This kind of information is more consistent with
Liu and Serfes approach. Consider now the case where ﬁrms buy from diﬀerent external sources information
about demographics, in particular, about where each consumer resides. Suppose the European ﬁrm has access to
information revealing that a given consumer lives in a neighborhood where 60% of residents drive American cars
and 30% drive European cars. The signal is informative but nevertheless is noisy. The European ﬁrm would price
cautiously because the consumer may turn out to prefer European cars. This information is more consistent with
our deﬁnition of information.
30See footnote 6.
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can charge higher prices to consumers recognised as loyal at low levels of information precision,
the probability of winning a customer with a loyal price is small. Thus, the expected surplus
extraction beneﬁt is not enough to overcome the reduction in proﬁts due to a lower price being
charged to a consumer recognised as disloyal. Additionally, as each consumer is a market to be
contested as ﬁrms have access to better information, they price more aggressively which results
in lower proﬁts. In Liu and Serfes (2004) at low levels of information quality, information is not
ﬁne enough to allow ﬁrms to extract consumer surplus, and so proﬁts initially decrease. As ﬁrms
have access to better information, the partition becomes more reﬁned, ﬁrms are more certain
about the location of each consumer and the surplus extraction eﬀect becomes the dominant
one. Proﬁts start to increase.
Chen et al. (2001) predict that proﬁts have an inverse U-shaped relation with information
accuracy. They also show that both ﬁrms might beneﬁt from price discrimination based on
more accurate information (which they designate as targetability) when the level of information
precision is low. Speciﬁcally, they show that when ﬁrms depart from low levels of targetab-
ility, proﬁts increase as targetability improves. A prisoner’s dilemma result only occurs when
information accuracy reaches a suﬃciently high level. The intuition for their result is as follows.
At low levels of information accuracy, information improvements allow ﬁrms to extract more
surplus from their captive customers as they are increasingly able to identify them. At the
same time, when information accuracy is moderated, ﬁrms can not fully separate switchers from
captive customers which has the strategic eﬀect of soften price competition for the switchers.
As information accuracy improves, consumers can be segmented more accurately, ﬁrms compete
more aggressively for the switchers. As a result the expected surplus extraction beneﬁt from
captive consumers is not enough to overcome the reduction in proﬁts due to a lower price being
charged to a switcher. Thus, the three mass support is responsible from generating the diﬀerent
results in Chen et al. (2001).
As in the previous literature ﬁrms can face a prisoner’s dilemma. However, the quality
of information available to recognise customers/price discriminate can act as a restriction to
more aggressive pricing. Like in our model, in Chen et al. (2001) the ability of ﬁrms to
segment consumers too accurately is the worst context for proﬁts. In this paper and in Liu and
Serfes (2004), when information is fully uninformative there is a credible kind of commitment
to uniform pricing, with positive eﬀects on proﬁts. This suggests that competing ﬁrms could all
beneﬁt from privacy regulations restricting the use of tracking systems that collect information
about consumers and/or the use of recognition technologies. These policies would limit the
ﬁrms’ ability to recognise customers, thereby avoiding the practice of price discrimination in
more aggressive competitive contexts.
Consumer welfare eﬀects This paper and Liu and Serfes (2004) predict that consumer
surplus is always above its no discrimination counterpart. However, while here consumer surplus
increases monotonically as the quality of information increases, in Liu and Serfes (2004) consumer
surplus exhibits an inverse U-relationship with the information quality, meaning that moderate
information quality is the most beneﬁcial informational context for consumers. After a certain
level of information quality further increases in quality lead some consumers to start paying
higher prices and consumer welfare decreases. In our model, although for small levels of the
signal’s accuracy loyal customers are expected to pay higher prices, it is also true that with
some positive probability they will be misrecognised and so they will have the chance to buy
the product at the lowest price. Though a ﬁrm tends to charge higher prices to perceived loyal
customers when b is low, it is also true that it is more likely that the ﬁrm mistakenly recognises a
true loyal customer as a disloyal when b is low. As a result, expected consumer surplus is always
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above the non-discrimination level and increases monotonically with information improvements.
Finally, although Chen et al. (2001) provide no consumer welfare analysis it can be said that
better information is the worst scenario for a captive customer who is expected to pay the
monopoly price and the best scenario for a switcher. The overall eﬀect on consumer surplus will
depend on the average losses for captive consumers and gains for switchers.
7 Conclusions
This paper has tried to provide a more complete picture of the prices, proﬁts and welfare eﬀects of
price discrimination as information technologies gradually improve the ﬁrms’ ability to recognise
the consumers’ types. The main contribution was to extend the previous literature by allowing
ﬁrms to price discriminate on the basis of imperfect and private information. In doing so, besides
a customer may be wrongly recognised by some ﬁrm, he can also be recognised in a diﬀerent
way by the competing ﬁrms.
It was shown that customers recognised as loyal pay always a higher price than those recog-
nised as disloyal. This result is in consonance with the practice of charging more to old than
to ﬁrst-time customers. It was also shown that customers recognised as loyal are expected to
pay prices above the non-discrimination level when information is not too accurate, while the
reverse happens when information becomes more precise. By contrast, it was found that cus-
tomers recognised as disloyal are expected to pay lower prices under price discrimination, and
increasingly lower prices as the accuracy of the private signal rises.
By proposing a diﬀerent way of modeling information improvements, it was shown that
the equilibrium outcomes may diﬀer from those in Chen et al. (2001) and Liu and Serfes
(2004). It was shown that the availability of the private signal (and so price discrimination)
beneﬁts consumers, but is bad for industry proﬁt and welfare. More importantly, we found
that consumer welfare increases monotonically as the accuracy of the private signal rises, while
the reverse happens to industry proﬁt and overall welfare. The model suggests that any public
policy protecting consumer privacy, by restricting ﬁrms to recognise customers more accurately,
would beneﬁt all competing ﬁrms at the expense of consumer welfare.
A relevant contribution of this paper was to show that the answer to the question “how
do proﬁt, consumer surplus and overall welfare change as ﬁrms have access to more accurate
information about consumers?” do depend on the way in which one models the information im-
provements and on the nature of consumer preferences. The robustness of the model was checked
by extending it to public information. The observation of a public signal instead of a private
one, produces the same qualitative results. The public signal increases the informativeness of
both ﬁrms, and the eﬀect is the same as an increase in the accuracy of the signals. Consumers
are better oﬀ with public information, while ﬁrms are better oﬀ with private information.31
Notwithstanding the model addressed in this paper is far from covering all complex aspects
of real markets, it has tried to oﬀer a closer approximation of reality where the quality of
consumer-speciﬁc information that ﬁrms have been using to implement their pricing policies
is increasingly improving thanks to advances in information and recognition technologies. It
suggests that any advice to a regulatory authority should take into account the features of
each market and whether the target is welfare or solely consumer surplus. In those markets that
could be reasonably well represented by the features of the current model, restrictions protecting
consumer privacy and limiting the eﬃcacy of price discrimination would beneﬁt industry proﬁts
31This extension can be found in an online appendix available at ht-
tps://sites.google.com/site/estevesrosabranca/
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and overall welfare but at the expense of consumer welfare.32
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. If ρα  ρβ one must observe that:
2λαα ≥ 2λβα or
1
4
+
b2
12
≥
1
4
−
b2
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which is true ∀b ∈ [0, 1] .
Proof of Proposition 1. From the ﬁrst-order conditions for both ﬁrms we obtain:
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Considering for instance the perspective of ﬁrm A, second-order partial derivatives with respect
to both prices are
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−pAαραg
′
αα

pAα − p
B
α

− pAα (1− ρα) g
′
αβ

pAα − p
B
β

,
∂2E

πA | sA = β

∂pA2β
= −2ρβgβα

pAβ − p
B
α

− 2

1− ρβ

gββ

pAβ − p
B
β

−pAβ ρβg
′
βα

pAβ − p
B
α

− pAβ

1− ρβ

g′ββ

pAβ − p
B
β

and,
∂2E

πA | sA = α

∂pAα∂p
A
β
= 0.
Symmetric conditions hold for ﬁrm B. Due to symmetry we are looking for an equilibrium
where pAα = p
B
β = pL and p
A
β = p
B
α = pD. Thus, making y = pL − pD, and using without loss of
generality the perspective of ﬁrm A, one gets:
pL = p
α
A =
ρα [1−Gαα (y)] + (1− ρα) [1−Gαβ (0)]
ραgαα (y) + (1− ρα) gαβ (0)
32 It is important to stress that the discussion on consumer privacy issues is far more complex than the present
analysis which has only looked on the use of information about consumers for price discrimination purposes.
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pD = p
A
β =
ρβ [1−Gβα (0)] +

1− ρβ

[1−Gββ (−y)]
ρβgβα (0) +

1− ρβ

gββ (−y)
 .
Then second-order partial derivatives for ﬁrm A are then equal to:
∂2E

πA | sA = α

∂pA2α
= −2ραgαa (y)− 2 (1− ρα) gαβ (0)− pLραg
′
αα (y)− pL (1− ρα) g
′
αβ (0)
and
∂2E

πA | sA = β

∂pA2β
= −2ρβgβα (0)− 2

1− ρβ

gββ (−y)− pDρβg
′
βα (0)− pD

1− ρβ

g′ββ (−y) .
Since,
1−Gαα (y) =
1
λαα
 1
2
y

1
2
+ bl
2
dl =
1
λαα

1
8
+
1
8
b+
1
24
b2 −
1
4
y −
1
2
by2 −
1
3
b2y3

,
1−Gαβ (0) =
1
λαβ
 1
2
0

1
2
+ bl

1
2
− bl

dl =
1
λαβ

1
8
−
1
24
b2

,
gαα (y) =
1
λαα

1
2
+ by
2
, gαβ (0) =
1
λαβ

1
4

,
1−Gββ (−y) =
1
λββ
 1
2
−y

1
2
− bl
2
dl =
1
λββ

1
8
−
1
8
b+
1
24
b2 +
1
4
y +
1
2
by2 +
1
3
b2y3

,
1−Gβα (0) =
1
λβα
 1
2
0

1
4
− b2l2

dl =
1
λβα

1
8
−
1
24
b2

,
gβα (0) =
1
λβα

1
4

, and gββ (−y) =
1
λββ

1
2
+ by
2
.
It is now easy to check that second-order conditions for a maximum are satisﬁed. Using the
expressions derived above, and the fact that
g′αα (y) =
2b
λαα

1
2
+ by

, g′αβ (0) = g
′
βα (0) = 0, and g
′
ββ (−y) = −
2b
λββ

1
2
+ by

it is straightforward to observe that:
∂2E

πA | sA = α

∂pA2α
= −2ραgαα (y)− 2 (1− ρα) gαβ (0)− pLραg
′
αα (y)
= −4

1
2
+ by
2
− 1− 4bpL

1
2
+ by

< 0,
and
∂2E

πA | sA = β

∂pA2β
= −2ρβgβα (0)− 2

1− ρβ

gββ (−y)− pD

1− ρβ

g′ββ (−y)
= −4λβα
1
λβα

1
4

− 4λββ
1
λββ

1
2
+ by
2
− pD (2λββ)

−
2b
λββ

1
2
+ by

= −1− 4

1
2
+ by

1
2
+ b (y − pD)

.
19
Despite the fact that b (y − pD) < 0 we ﬁnd that for 0 ≤ b ≤ 1, 0.41 ≤
1
2
+ b (y − pD) ≤ 0.5
thus
∂2E(πA|sA=β)
∂pA2
β
< 0. In sum, since
∂2E(πA|sA=α)
∂pA2α
< 0 and
∂2E(πA|sA=α)
∂pA2α

∂2E(πA|sA=β)
∂pA2β

−

∂2E(πA|sA=α)
∂pAα∂p
A
β
2
> 0 it follows that second-order condi-
tions for a maximum are as well satisﬁed.
After some algebra, we ﬁnd that the prices ﬁrms set after observing a loyal and a disloyal
signal are, respectively:
pL =
1
4
+ 1
8
b− 1
4
y − 1
2
by2 − 1
3
b2y3
1
2
+ by + b2y2
, and (28)
pD =
1
4
− 1
8
b+ 1
4
y + 1
2
by2 + 1
3
b2y3
1
2
+ by + b2y2
. (29)
Proof of Lemma 2. Due to symmetry let γL and γD denote the probability of a ﬁrm
winning a customer with a loyal and a disloyal signal. Using, for instance, the perspective of
ﬁrm A,
γL = Pr (ﬁrm A wins customer | sA = α)
=

r∈{α,β}
Pr

pAα < p
B
r + l | sA = α, sB = r

Pr (sB = r | sA = α)
= [1−Gαα(y)] ρα + [1−Gαβ(0)] (1− ρα) , and,
γD = Pr (ﬁrm A wins customer | sA = β)
=

r∈{α,β}
Pr

pAα < p
B
r + l | sA = α, sB = r

Pr (sB = r | sA = α)
= [1−Gβα(0)] ρβ + [1−Gββ(−y)]

1− ρβ

.
After some algebra we obtain:
γL =
1
2
+
1
4
b−
1
2
y − by2 −
2
3
b2y3 =
1
2
+ b2y3 + by2 +
1
2
y, and
γD =
1
2
−
1
4
b+
1
2
y + by2 +
2
3
b2y3 =
1
2
− b2y3 − by2 −
1
2
y.
Proof of Lemma 3. For each individual consumer with brand loyalty parameter l ∈
−1
2
, 1
2

each ﬁrm observes a binary signal. Therefore,
ECS = (v − pL)
 1
2
−1
2
(1− q(l)) q(l)f(l)dl + (v − pD)
 1
2
− 1
2
(1− q(l)) q(l)f(l)dl
+
 1
2
0
max {v − pL, v − pD − l} (q(l))
2 f(l)dl + (v − pD)

0
− 1
2
(q(l))2 f(l)dl

0
− 1
2
max {v − pL, v − pD + l} (1− q(l))
2 f(l)dl + (v − pD)
 1
2
0
(1− q(l))2 f(l)dl.
After some algebra and using the fact that y = pL − pD, one ﬁnds that
ECS = v − pL

1
2
+
1
4
b−
1
2
y − by2 −
2
3
b2y3

− pD

1
2
−
1
4
b+
1
2
y + by2 +
2
3
b2y3

−
1
4
y2 −
2
3
by3 −
1
2
b2y4 = v − pLγL − pDγD −
1
4
y2 −
2
3
by3 −
1
2
b2y4.
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